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The effort to achieve a comprehensive revision of the penal code had occupied German professors and practitioners of criminal law since the Kaiserreich. 1 But the penal reform movement and the official reform commissions, which continued all the way up to the Nazi regime's penal reform commission under Justice Minister Franz Gürtner, remained unsuccessful. This chapter investigates when penal reform reappeared on the agenda of German criminal law professors after 1945 and what shape this new penal reform discourse took. The early postwar phase of the reform discourse had little influence on the comprehensive penal reform that was eventually passed in 1969 or on the revisions of laws on sexual offenses that took place from 1969 to 1973. But this early phase is of considerable interest because it reveals the complex mix of continuity and change in a particular discipline at a moment of political rupture and because it reconstructs how a new reform discourse emerged under the influence of the experiences of the Nazi period and the social and cultural upheavals of the postwar era.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the penal code and of the situation of academic criminal law at the universities around 1945. The next two sections examine the debates on natural law and the question of why there were no efforts to completely revise the criminal code immediately after 1945. This issue leads into the following two sections, which explore the work situation, publication venues, and professional meetings of legal academics in the field of criminal law after 1945. The final two sections trace which professors participated in the reform debates and examine the two basic positions in the reform discourse:
In terms of penal theory, the Reich Penal Code was based on a combination of retributive justice and general deterrence: general deterrence through just retribution. 11 Since the late nineteenth century, the debates about reforming the criminal code centered around three elements of punishment: retribution, general deterrence (Generalprävention), and specific (i.e., individual) deterrence (Spezialprävention). In the discourse on criminal law, the concept of retribution was usually derived from Kant and Hegel's theories of absolute punishment.
Justice," Radbruch assigned the primary blame for judicial compliance with Nazism to legal positivism (Gesetzespositivismus). Legal positivism, Radbruch argued, "with its conviction that 'law is law' rendered the German legal profession defenseless against laws of arbitrary and criminal content." 23 Although a comprehensive analysis and critique of Radbruch's "positivism thesis" cannot be pursued here, it should be noted that legal-historical studies have identified numerous cases in which judges handed down sentences that went beyond the National Socialist laws and many instances of legal academics interpreting the existing laws very broadly, thus demonstrating that legal positivism actually played little role in Nazi jurisprudence. 24 In the postwar era, however, Radbruch's thesis had considerable appeal because it offered "easy exoneration" for both legal practitioners and legal academics. 25 After all, a legal theory could hardly be put in the dock for criminal prosecution; and blaming a theory also conveniently obviated questions about personal responsibility for legal verdicts during the Nazi era. The exoneration was made still more effective by the fact that Radbruch himself could not be accused of wanting to exculpate Nazi justice. As a staunch democrat Radbruch was above suspicion politically and in no way tainted by National Socialism. He had lost his university chair immediately after the Nazi seizure of power. In addition, Radbruch himself had been considered a representative of legal positivism during the Weimar Republic, which gave his critique special validity. 26 Radbruch thought that "overcoming positivism" 27 could represent a new beginning even though, unlike other jurists, he shied away from a simple endorsement of natural law and timeless legal norms. 28 Instead, he situated law in a field of tension between legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit), justice (Gerechtigkeit), and expedience (Zweckmä ßigkeit), with an emphasis on the first two aspects:
The conflict between justice and legal certainty [Rechtssicherheit] should be resolved by granting priority to the existing positive law that is secured by statutes and power even when its content is unjust and inexpedient [unzweckmäßig] , unless the contradiction between the positive law and justice reaches such an unbearable extent that the law, as "incorrect law" [unrichtiges Recht] must give way to justice. It is impossible to draw a sharper line between cases of legal injustice [gesetzlichen Unrechts] and laws that remain valid despite their incorrect content. Another boundary, however, can be drawn quite sharply: Where justice is not even striven for, where equality, which constitutes the core of justice, is intentionally denied in the establishment of positive laws, in those cases the law is not only "incorrect law" but lacks the character of a legal norm [Rechtsnatur] altogether. For law, even positive law, cannot be defined as anything other than an order and statute whose very purpose is to serve justice. 29 Despite his skepticism regarding natural law, 30 Radbruch stood at the beginning of the "renaissance of natural law" that took place after 1945; many authors explicitly referred to his arguments. 31 The early postwar years saw the publication of numerous essays and books on natural law that resolved the conflict of legal positivism versus natural law in favor of the latter. Participants in this discussion included jurists-not only from the field of criminal law-as well as theologians and philosophers. 32 Although natural law was not always discussed with reference to a Christian canon of values-Radbruch himself did not make such references-religious arguments were common. The reference to Christian values was appealing given the prominent postwar role of both the Protestant and Catholic Churches as allegedly untainted institutions. 33 The influence of Christian traditions, especially Catholic natural law, steered the postwar jurisprudence that was based on natural law arguments in a conservative direction, which was especially apparent in the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof, the highest German court, in the 1950s. 34 In the immediate postwar years, natural law arguments served to condemn and reverse Nazi injustice. In contrast to many esoteric discussions in the realm of criminal jurisprudence (Strafrechtsdogmatik), the natural law debate was not without practical relevance. Legal arguments referencing natural law played an important role in the judicial practice of German criminal courts, especially in court decisions regarding Nazi justice and Nazi crimes. As the West German legal historian Winfried Hassemer has written, in the postwar years "criminal law jurists faced a problem of natural law that could not to be evaded: . . . [during the Nazi period] judges had applied the criminal laws, which had been established in a formally valid manner, and the result was a mockery of proportionality, fairness, and human dignity." 35 A legal reckoning with National Socialism-however inadequate it may be considered in retrospect-probably could not have taken place without resorting to standards based on natural law. This was not only true of the Nuremberg Trials, but also for many smaller trials, for example, trials in denunciation or desertion cases, and was reflected in the judgments of many German courts.
Among professors of criminal law, however, not everyone drew on natural law arguments. At one of the first postwar meetings of German jurists, in 1947, for instance, Hellmuth von Weber of the University of Bonn opposed the idea that individual judges should check criminal laws against a natural law standard. 36 Even Karl Peters, one of very few Catholic professors of criminal law, who was closely associated with Catholic moral teachings, represented more of a legal positivist view, arguing that the only time to refuse to obey a law was when "an overt, grave violation of natural law or the supernatural order is present" or "when the law is consciously driven by considerations that are foreign to the law." 37 Radbruch had supported a similar position, even if both differed in their terminology.
In evaluating the postwar years, one would have to agree with Dieter Simon's assessment that both the law faculties and the courts "made their way back to natural law." 38 With the exception of the jurisprudence of the Bundesgerichtshof, however, it is not clear how long the sway of natural law over legal academics and legal practitioners lasted. The contemporary evidence is contradictory. Whereas as late as 1955 criminal law professor Thomas Würtenberger still claimed that "after overcoming legal positivist inhibitions and prejudices, natural law presently dominates not only the theory of criminal law but also its practice," 39 two years earlier his colleague Hans Welzel had already argued the contrary: "A relatively rapid disenchantment has spread. The enthusiasm for natural law has been replaced by a renewed turn toward positive law." Although he himself was a critic of natural law, Welzel warned: "Seven years after the collapse, we find ourselves . . . in severe danger of sliding back into an extreme legal positivism [Gesetzespositivis mus]." 40 These differing judgments regarding the duration of the postwar natural law renaissance may be explained by the differing sources used to support the two arguments. Whereas Würtenberger's thesis is supported by a wealth of monographs and essays on the subject of natural law and legal positivism published in this period, Welzel's statement referred to a decision by the Oberlandesgericht (Superior District Court) Hamburg and to a decree of the British military government, both of which asserted the validity of a law even when it contradicted supra-legal principles. 41 Even the Bundesgerichtshof decision of 1954 regarding Ver lobten-Kuppelei, which declared sexual intercourse between adults who were engaged to be indecent, raises doubts about the long-term effects of the renaissance of natural law. 42 For although the ruling's natural law argumentation appears to support Würtenberger's position, the decision met with massive criticism among professors of criminal law; only the Catholic Karl Peters praised the decision. Parallel to the natural law debate, the immediate postwar period faced the issue of removing the specifically National Socialist influences and formulations in criminal law. The issues involved ranged from the removal of specific Nazi terms such as gesundes Volksempfinden (healthy popular sentiment) 44 and the repeal of clearly National Socialist penal laws such as those regarding Rassenschande (race defilement) to the removal of newly introduced penal sanctions such as castration 45 and some highly controversial subjects. The latter included the question of whether the 1935 changes made to the penal code's article 175, which aggravated the prosecution and punishment of male homosexuality, were National Socialist in nature or well within the scope of similar pre-1933 legislation. 46 The initial legal basis for changes of the penal code was provided by the laws issued by the Allied Control Council and by the decrees of the military governments in the individual zones of occupation. 47 The basic principles for this process had been laid down by the Potsdam Conference, which had decreed "that the legal system shall be purified in accordance with the basic principles of democracy, equality before the law, and equal rights for all citizens, without regard to race, nationality, or religion." 48 Implementing this decision, the military governments restricted the imposition of the death penalty and made major changes in the penal code in several comprehensive laws. 49 In West Germany, this process continued with the permanent repeal of the death penalty in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) and further far-reaching modifications of the criminal law in a series of laws amending the criminal code, the so-called Strafrechtsänderungsgese-tze (StrÄG), starting in 1951. These laws, however, were not limited to purging the penal code of Nazi elements. Through new definitions of political offenses (1. StrÄG of 30 August 1951) the new laws already reflected the influence of the Cold War, and by introducing suspended sentences on probation (3. StrÄG of 4 August 1953), they embarked on new paths in penal policy. 50 Given the numerous attempts at penal reform from the Kaiserreich through the Nazi era and the considerable number of changes to the penal code that were needed in the postwar period, the question arises of why a fundamental reform of criminal law was not attempted early on after the war. There were, however, good arguments against such an approach, including the division of the country into different zones of occupation, the lack of a sovereign lawmaker, as well as the chaotic economic and social conditions of the postwar years. In 1946, criminal law professor Eberhard Schmidt regarded the "revision of the penal system" as "irrefutably necessary," but doubted whether this could be realized at that time:
Here we see quite clearly that a penal reform that strives for justice and effectiveness in penal policy requires orderly state, social, and moral conditions. . . . Only when we emerge from the current chaos, when we live in orderly social conditions, and when, last but not least, the individual is given back his moral center [sittliche Selbstbestimmung], and a fundamental recognition of human dignity and human rights has finally taken place, can we make an attempt at a just and rational penal reform with any hope of success. 51 Especially Germany's division into zones of occupation and their later transformation into two states appeared to be detrimental to a fundamental penal reform. Richard Lange, one of the first professors of criminal law to address the issue of penal reform after 1945, formulated this clearly in 1949: "In the interest of the unity of the Reich, one will certainly refrain from intervening in the criminal code. Our present situation does not call for comprehensive legislation in this area."
52 Despite Lange's rejection of a comprehensive reform, he was not satisfied with the status quo and did not content himself with simply purging the criminal code of Nazi influences. In his revision of the criminal code for Thuringia in 1945, he had called for major changes by introducing "indefinite sentencing" for "dangerous habitual offenders" instead of increased penalties or preventive detention. 53 By changing the order of the "Maßregeln zur Siche rung und Besserung" (Measures for Prevention and Correction) of the 1933 Law on Habitual Criminals to "Maßregeln der Besserung und Sicherung," he sought to give the idea of rehabilitation priority over the protection of society. 54 The legal academics who viewed the chances of fundamental penal reform with skepticism in the postwar years had one dissenter, Karl Peters. Already in 1947, Peters anticipated that work on reforms would soon begin and called for the formulation of Catholic interests for this project: "It is our task to grapple with the numerous problems early enough so that we can make our contribution to the revision of criminal law when the time comes." 55 
The Situation of the Criminal Law Professors after 1945
The question of why only a few professors of criminal law tackled the issue of a comprehensive reform of criminal law in the immediate postwar years requires an examination of their circumstances of work and life, a classic approach in the sociology of knowledge. In 1946 Eberhard Schmidt had spoken of "orderly social circumstances" and the overcoming of the "present chaos" as preconditions for taking up the project of reforming the penal code. The circumstances of the professors, by contrast, were characterized by uncertainties in many respects, in some cases into the 1950s. Leaving aside the precarious socioeconomic conditions of the postwar era (regarding food and housing), which were shared by the majority of the population, 56 I will focus on the specific situation of the legal academics regarding their opportunities and conditions of work. University professors are members of an extremely specialized profession who can practice their profession only in a few places. In 1937, these were the twenty-three universities in the territory of the old Reich, as well as the German University in Prague, to which after 1938 the three Austrian universities in Graz, Innsbruck, and Vienna were added. As a result of Nazi occupations, the universities in Posen and Strasbourg also fell under German authority, so that the "German University Guide" of 1941 counted a total of twenty-nine universities with law faculties.
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After 1945 the number of work opportunities was drastically reduced. 58 Prague, Breslau, Königsberg, Posen, and Strasbourg returned to the formerly occupied countries or ended up as part of other nations in the wake of the reorganization of Europe. In Austria, the German university teachers had to vacate their positions. In the territory occupied by the Soviets (SBZ) and the later German Democratic Republic (GDR), the law faculties in Greifswald 59 and Rostock 60 were closed, and many law professors from the other universities emigrated to the western zones. All in all, the universities in the western zones of occupation absorbed nearly all of the professors of criminal law from the rest of the universities listed in 1941. These included the universities of East Berlin, Greifswald, Halle, Jena, Leipzig, and Rostock; the Austrian universities of Graz, Innsbruck, and Vienna; and the universities of Königsberg, Breslau, Posen, Strasbourg, and the German University in Prague. For professors of criminal law, this meant that the number of potential employers was reduced from twenty-nine to initially fourteen. 61 Through the founding of new universities, the University of Mainz in 1946 and the Free University of Berlin in 1948, the number of universities in West Germany and West Berlin increased to a total of sixteen. 62 German university professors also taught at the University of Saarbrücken, founded in 1948, which until the incorporation of the Saar into the Federal Republic in 1957 was situated on French territory.
Most of the universities in the three western zones of occupation were affected by war damage. 63 Only the universities of Heidelberg 64 and Tübingen 65 made it through the war nearly unscathed; the universities in Erlangen 66 and Göttingen suffered only minor damage. In the last months of the war and the immediate postwar period, the University of Göttingen became the gathering place for professors from the eastern universities, 67 while Strasbourg University and the law, political science, and economics faculties from Freiburg and Heidelberg were moved to Tübingen. 68 All other universities had suffered severe damage. 69 Despite the damage and the cuts in personnel, the universities returned to teaching relatively quickly, some as soon as the Fall of 1945. 70 But another factor added to the uncertainty of professors: denazification. The military defeat of Nazi Germany and the division of the country into four zones of occupation resulted in denazification procedures that obliged university teachers to undergo individual examinations of their past during the Third Reich. Nearly all professors had to submit to this scrutiny of their political and academic careers during National Socialism. The guidelines for these procedures, however, showed significant differences between the occupation zones; 71 moreover, they varied from university to university within the same zone, and, in fact, depended largely on the local military government and even the individual university officer (Universitäts offizier). 72 In general, it can be said that the purges of the university teaching corps were most radical in the Soviet zone of occupation, followed by those in the American zone. In the British and the French zones, the approach of the occupation authorities was more moderate and more strongly shaped by pragmatic considerations. 73 For one criminal law professor, Karl Siegert, the end of the Nazi regime spelled the end of his career. 74 For the majority of the professors of criminal law, however, denazification meant only a short interruption in their career. While many could return to their positions after a few months, for others the denazification procedure lasted between one and three years. For professors like Edmund Mezger (Munich) and Gotthold Bohne (Cologne), denazification brought only relatively short interruptions of their university teaching; Mezger, for example, was reinstated in 1948. Hamburg criminal law professor Rudolf Sieverts was detained by the British occupation authority in 1945, 75 but soon returned to his position. A few professors had to wait longer until they were able to return to the universities in the wake of the so-called "131-er" Law of April 1951, which facilitated the reinstatement of former civil servants: among these were Georg Dahm and Friedrich Schaffstein (both of whom had been militant National Socialists from the very beginning of the Third Reich), as well as Heinrich Henkel and Hans-Jürgen Bruns. 76 Other professors, such as Thomas Würtenberger, changed universities when their denazification did not go well for them; Würtenberger moved from Erlangen to Mainz. 77 These professors exploited the varying intensity with which the occupying powers pursued denazification. Whereas the Americans, in whose zone Erlangen was located, carried out the purges with great seriousness, the French were more lenient. Würtenberger was not the only one to find a haven in the French zone of occupation after 1945; Ulrich Stock, who was dismissed from his Marburg post in 1945, joined the Saarbrücken faculty in 1948. 78 If one looks at specific universities and the biographies of individual professors, it becomes clear that denazification certainly had a share in producing discontinuities in university faculties. For the early postwar period, the high fluctuation of this group is particularly apparent. Their lives, like those of the population as a whole, were characterized by a high degree of mobility.
79 Only a few biographies show no change of university in the immediate postwar years. And in contrast to "normal" times, these moves to a different university were not motivated by offers of a famous university chair or a prestigious university. 80 Such career moves become apparent again only in the mid-1950s at the earliest, when, to take Thomas Würtenberger as an example, he left his professorship in Mainz to take up a university chair in Freiburg, which he retained for the next eighteen years until he was granted emeritus status. 81 The tight employment market for law professors was somewhat improved by the establishment of new universities, retirements, and the dismissal or suspension of a number of professors in the denazification process. We should also note that the number of law professors had declined in the Nazi era, and that in the last years of the war law faculties had further contracted as professors were drafted into military service, died, or became prisoners of war. After the war, there was therefore increased demand for law professors, especially at the universities in the western zones.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the criminal law professors, the postwar years were a time of extreme uncertainty and high mobility under difficult conditions. Professors who arrived in the western zones of occupation from universities that ended up in the Soviet zone or fell to other states in the wake of territorial reorganization could not usually hope for a seamless continuation of their careers. To be sure, Eberhard Schmidt, who left Leipzig, immediately received a professorship in Göttingen because the dismissal of Karl Siegert left one of the two chairs in criminal law vacant. 82 But Schmidt lived in rather makeshift conditions in Göttingen, while his family remained in the Soviet zone. 83 His colleague Paul Bockelmann, formerly a full professor in Königsberg, had to be content with adjunct teaching in Göttingen from 1946 to 1949, until he was appointed to a full professorship there after Eberhard Schmidt's move to Heidelberg . 84 A similar trajectory was shared by Friedrich Schaffstein, who had much greater difficulties with the denazification process (for good reason) and therefore did not get an adjunct appointment at Göttingen until 1952; within two years, however, he succeeded Hans Welzel as full professor after Welzel had moved to Bonn. 85 Although university professors were certainly no worse off than the rest of the population in terms of their living and working conditions, postwar conditions were subjectively experienced as particularly difficult by this highly privileged social group, most of whom, certainly among the law professors, had been born into the propertied and educated middle classes. These social-psychological circumstances were, of course, not conducive to a return to penal reform debates. The top priorities for most law professors, aside from surviving the immediate postwar period, were the continuation of their careers, the restoration of their former workplaces, the replacement of the law libraries and teaching materials, and the building of new university structures.
Denazification and the control exercised by the occupying powers also led to a depoliticization of university professors in the early postwar years. Especially for jurists the early postwar motto was: "Whatever you do, don't stand out!" Concerned about uncertain career prospects, handicapped by denazification proceedings, and limited by precarious institutional settings, most did not consider it advisable to attract attention through bold pronouncements on fundamental policy matters such as the shaping of the future criminal law. Those who did so were usually among those who were not compromised by association with the Nazi regime (at least in the postwar judgment of their colleagues), such as Richard Lange and Eberhard Schmidt, or convinced democrats who had passed through the Nazi period completely untainted, such as Gustav Radbruch. Despite these exceptions, the work of criminal law professors after 1945 was generally characterized by a retreat from politics and a turn to "pure" scholarship. This was true, of course, not only for the academic field of criminal law, but for professors and the universities in general. After years of the "political university" and politicized scholarship under the Nazi regime, this turn away from politics in the academic field of criminal law was reflected in a preference for issues of jurisprudence and legal philosophy over questions of penal policy. This escapism often took the form of philosophical meditations on the meaning of punishment, justice, or the gap between ought and is, all conducted in the academic style of humanist education. Work in this vein was complemented by legal-historical studies, through which politically compromised professors of criminal law reentered the academic conversation and sought to rehabilitate themselves; witness, for example, Friedrich 
Publication Venues and Professional Meetings After 1945
In addition to the changes in the working and living conditions after 1945, the resumption of a discourse of penal reform was hampered by the scarcity of professional journals and the initial lack of opportunities for meeting at conferences. There were few professional venues at which the isolation of the individual scholar could be overcome and opinions shaped. Moreover, the first postwar meetings of German jurists were held under the aegis of the occupying powers.
Thematically, the professional meetings of jurists after 1945-held mostly for the individual zones-primarily discussed problems of judicial practice and the organization of the courts. 86 After the Association of German Jurists (Deutscher Juristen tag) assembled again in 1949, the first meeting of its criminal law section, in 1950, addressed offenses related to the protection of the state. Not until the following year was the revision of the criminal code placed on the Juristentag's agenda. 87 The professors of criminal law did not resume their own professional meetings until 1952. 88 The most important media for the criminal law professors' reform discourse were the legal journals. After the end of the occupying powers' licensing policy, the number of legal periodicals increased in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. The Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung (SJZ) and the Deutsche Rechts -Zeitschrift (DRZ), 89 licensed in 1946 for the American and French zones, respectively, fused in 1951 to become the Juristen-Zeitung (JZ). 90 In the same year, the 96 In addition to the German periodicals, German legal academics also used the journals of other German-speaking countries for their publications. In Austria, these consisted of the Österreichische Juristenzeitung and the Juristische Blätter. In Switzerland, the most important was the Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht, which in the Nazi era had given emigrated German law professors Gustav Radbruch and Wolfgang Mittermaier the opportunity to publish.
The Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform, the only journal whose title included the words "penal reform," was neither a preferred forum for professors of criminal law, nor were its articles primarily focused on penal reform. During the 1950s, the Monatsschrift featured only a handful essays by professors of criminal law. Even Rudolf Sieverts, who co-edited the journal together with Hans Gruhle, professor for psychiatry in Bonn, published only one article and an obituary (1959) there. Of the fifty articles published in the Monatsschrift from 1954 to 1957 only 10 percent were written by professors of criminal law; a further 16 percent by other jurists (including judges and junior scholars); and 18 percent by prison psychologists, prison clerics, and other prison staff. The largest share, 56 percent, was comprised of contributions from medical doctors, especially psychiatrists (twenty-eight articles).
97 Only a few of the contributions addressed the issue of penal reform; the overwhelming majority of articles were devoted to issues of criminology and criminal psychology, the prison system, and juvenile justice. This analysis therefore confirms how little interest criminal law professors showed in criminological issues compared to their interest in jurisprudence and legal philosophy.
The Participants in the Postwar Discourse on Penal Reform
From the 1880s through the Nazi regime, penal reform had been a central topic for German professors of criminal law. Although one might have thought that, after the initial restrictions of the postwar era had passed, criminal law professors would have been eager to resume the debate in the 1950s, in fact very few did so. Of the about thirty-five professors of criminal law who taught at West German universities (or continued to publish as emeriti), only a tiny minority published articles that addressed central issues of penal reform. If the others made any contributions at all, they only addressed partial aspects of reform. 98 The minority of professors who took an active part in the reform discourse included some members of the official Commission on Criminal Law which began its work in 1954 (Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Richard Lange, Eberhard Schmidt), but also Karl Peters, whose contributions appeared in legal journals as well as publications associated with the Catholic Church, and Thomas Würtenberger, whose articles often focused on the system of penal sanctions and the prison system. Paul Bockelmann, Karl Alfred Hall, Wilhelm Sauer, and Walter Sax also made some contributions; Karl Engisch and Wilhelm Gallas published the reports they prepared for the Commission on Criminal Law.
Those professors of criminal law who experienced a longer interruption in their careers as a result of denazification made almost no contributions regarding penal reform. Ulrich Stock published a single essay on reform in 1952, 99 and Hans-Jürgen Bruns commented on suspended sentencing in 1956 and on "measures of correction" in 1959. 100 Georg Dahm, a prominent voice for an explicitly National-Socialist approach to penal reform during the Third Reich, did not publish anything on penal reform after the war, whereas his comrade-in-arms Friedrich Schaffstein wrote primarily on juvenile justice after the war; not until 1963 did Schaffstein publish a piece on penal reform. 101 Karl Siegert, the only criminal law professor not to receive a professorship after 1945, published nothing on penal reform; neither did Heinrich Henkel or Erich Schwinge.
The enumeration of professors with a significant Nazi past who kept out of the postwar penal reform debate should not give the impression that those who actively participated in the debate after the war had escaped the Nazi period politically untainted. Rather, the Nazi pasts of those who participated in the debate were characterized by two traits: first, they had not been among the regime's favorites who were appointed to professorships in 1933-1934; second, their behavior during the Third Reich had been at least somewhat ambivalentin other words, political conformity in one area (for example, university politics) had coexisted with nonconformist behavior in another area (such as publications or private contacts with expelled colleagues).
The discussions in the academic field of criminal law did not, of course, center exclusively on penal reform. Professors of criminal law commented on amendments to the penal code and published monographs and articles on general and specialized topics in criminal law, textbooks, and commentaries on judicial decisions. In the area of criminal jurisprudence, the 1950s and 1960s were dominated by the debate about the "finale Handlungslehre" formulated by Hans Welzel, which offered a new approach to analyzing and judging the criminal act and the degree of guilt associated with it. 102 The discussion regarding natural law versus legal positivism was another area of emphasis.
The Penal Reform Debate: Retribution versus Individualized Prevention
The criminal law professors' discourse on penal reform was characterized by two competing positions. The first position saw the primary purpose of criminal justice in retribution (Vergeltung), to which all other functions of punishment were subordinated. The opposing position stressed Spezialprävention, individualized behavioral prevention, that is, preventing the individual perpetrator from offending again in the future. This position focused on rehabilitation, the system of penal sanctions, and the prison system. To be sure, the developments examined in this chapter so far-the post-1945 debate on natural law, the turn toward issues of legal philosophy, and the depoliticization of the university teacherswere all more suitable to defending the first position. Nevertheless, it should be noted that at least initially, the postwar penal reform discourse was fairly open regarding the future direction of reform.
The academic community's uncertainty about the future direction of criminal law reform can be illustrated by a lecture on the system of penal sanctions delivered by Karl Alfred Hall, professor of criminal law at Marburg, at the 1952 meeting of criminal law professors. In it Hall posed a number of central questions, including: 103 Should criminal law place more emphasis on retribution, general deterrence, or individualized behavioral prevention? How should the system of penal sanctions be reformed? Should the Zucht hausstrafe (imprisonment with hard labor) be retained as a distinct sanction, or should it be merged with the regular prison sentence (Gefängnisstrafe) in a unified prison sentence? How should the problem of short-term punishments be addressed in the future? Hall's answers to these questions were contradictory and logically inconsistent, as though he sought to keep open as many options as possible. The distinction between Zuchthaus and Gefängnis, for instance, was strongly criticized by proponents of individualized behavioral prevention because they regarded the Zuchthausstrafe as stigmatizing and hence hostile to rehabilitation. 104 But Hall's position on this issue was contradictory: even though he argued that the administration of both kinds of prison sentences should be unified, he also insisted that the distinction between Zucht haus and Gefängnis should be legally maintained "for reasons of general deterrence." 105 Regarding short-term prison sentences, Hall suggested setting three months as a minimum. 106 Prison terms under three months, he argued, should be replaced by fines, suspended sentences with probation (Strafaussetzung zur Bewährung), or special penalties such as suspending a driver's license or banning someone from a profession. 107 But although the replacement of short prison terms by alternative sanctions was a key demand of those who championed Spezialprävention, Hall 108 Even in his legitimation of probationary sentences, Hall referred to the retributivist idea of atonement (Sühne). "Atonement through probation" was the motto. 109 "The perpetrator atones for his deed by proving himself on the front of life." 110 Failure to prove himself did not necessarily mean committing another crime: "It suffices, for example, if he continues to be refractory [renitent] , if he violates the ban on visits to the tavern, seeks out bad company, and so on." 111 Here, the metaphysical idea of retribution was joined by an agenda of regulating behavior that was not limited to legal violations but sought to impose discipline. The proposed bans on tavern visits and "bad company" were indicative of anachronistic ideas about the "dangerous classes." Thus even though the content of Hall's proposals seemed to point in the direction of individualized behavioral prevention, the terminology he used showed his proximity to retributivism. In sum, his 1952 lecture marked the beginning of the retributivist discourse of penal reform that would characterize the official Commission on Criminal Law (Große Strafrechtskommission) convened in 1954. 112 The general discourse on penal reform as well as the official Commission on Criminal Law were dominated by the proponents of retributive justice. This assessment is supported not only by the predominance of retributivist publications, but also by the lack of opposition from the silent majority of criminal law professors who did not take part in the reform discourse. Retributive justice was based on the idea of nondeterminism, in other words, the notion of an individual free will that is not determined by genetics, environment, or upbringing. Central concepts for this position were justice, retribution, atonement, and value system (Wertordnung). Its proponents drew connections to the values of freedom and human dignity enshrined in the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and to the rule of law (Rechtsstaatsidee).
One of the most active proponents of retributivism in the postwar penal reform debate was Richard Lange, professor of criminal law in Cologne, who was well positioned to influence the debate through his dual role as a member of the official Commission on Criminal Law and editor-in-chief (Schriftleiter) of Germany's premier criminal law journal, the Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, from 1953 to 1968. Lange claimed that the ideal of retributive justice could be justified empirically, based on criminological studies, "historical experiences," and the reception of work in other disciplines such as psychology. 113 His reception of psychological research was, however, highly selective: Lange did not draw on the Freudian positions that would have contradicted his arguments, but on the Austrian psychologist Viktor Frankl, whose works, he argued, proved the indeterminate nature of man. Despite these limitations, Lange demonstrated a certain openness to other disciplines and to criminological research, which was highly unusual among his colleagues.
The arguments of the proponents of the retribution paradigm were characterized by a tendency to appeal to higher philosophical principles and to issue categorical statements, for example, regarding anthropological definitions of the "image of man" (Menschenbild) that supposedly lay at the root of criminal justice and penal reform. By the early 1960s, at least three studies by criminal law professors had appeared that were exclusively devoted to the image of man, not including numerous considerations of this issue in other essays and monographs. 114 In lectures, too, "the image of man and penal reform" was a popular subject, as demonstrated by a lecture with this title that Richard Lange delivered to the Society of Hamburg Jurists (Gesellschaft Hamburger Juristen) in 1962. 115 The image of man that was expounded in these lectures and publications was explicitly based on the West German constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). The Basic Law, it was argued, saw man as free and self-determined; therefore, it was deduced, man possessed free will and was morally and legally responsible for his actions; there was no room for determinism. For the retributivists, the Basic Law's injunction to respect and protect "human dignity" was evidence that the Basic Law rejected a criminal justice system based on either Spezialprävention or General prevention. Individual preventive measures such as rehabilitation, correctional education, and psychiatric treatment were rejected as excessive interventions in the life of the individual, while general deterrence was rejected as reducing the individual to a mere object in the deterrence of the general public. Characteristically, Hans-Heinrich Jescheck ended his essay on the "image of man and penal reform" with a reference to Hegel:
The image of man of our time [must] be determined by the great postulates of freedom and personal dignity, which form the supporting pillars of our state. In criminal law, the notion of [human] freedom must be understood in the sense that man, despite determining factors like drives, body-type, mental state, hereditary traits, and environment, is a being founded on individual responsibility. . . . Therefore punishment means that man is "held responsible" for his rebellion against a system of values that he, too, desires; and in this sense, Hegel's dictum that through punishment "the criminal is honored as a rational being" remains valid. 116 The retributivist contributions to the penal reform discourse were notable for their focus on ethical-philosophical questions, especially the "meaning" (Sinn) and "essence" (Wesen) of punishment and the "system of values" (Wertordnung) on which criminal law was supposed to rest. As Jescheck wrote: "Our time must give itself laws that reflect its own best nature in order to show the rest of the world its true purpose [Bestimmung] . . . . The spiritual situation of our time must be mastered through legislative achievements." 117 Such philosophically inclined texts obscured the political content of the positions; more generally, the contributions of retributivist criminal law professors to the penal reform debate were characterized by an avoidance of political references. This reflected the silence with which National Socialism was being treated in many areas of social and intellectual life. Although National Socialism was omnipresent, it was rarely referred to explicitly. Approaches favoring individual behavorial prevention (Spezialprävention) were denounced with vague references to Nazi criminal law and the omnipotent intervention of the Nazi state in the life of the individual citizen. This line of argument linked Spezialprävention and Zweckstrafe (a utilitarian, as opposed to retributive, conception to punishment) to a totalitarian criminal justice system that was hostile to freedom, as Wilhelm Gallas formulated it in the Commission on Criminal Law:
The Zweckgedanke [i.e., the notion that punishment should serve a preventive purpose] contains something hostile to freedom. To be sure, often, as in Nazi criminal law, the ideas of atonement and retribution [Sühne und Vergeltung] have been used to veil the Zweckgedanke. . . . The concern that das reine Zweckdenken can lead to totalitarian criminal justice forces us to hold fast to the notion of the Schuldstrafe [i.e., retributive punishment based on guilt]. 118 This strategy of discrediting the position that punishment primarily ought to serve the purpose of individualized behavioral prevention (rather than retributive justice)-which was the position of Franz von Liszt and the "modern school of criminal law" that dominated the penal reform movement in the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic-by associating it with Nazism and totalitarianism was characteristic of other retributivists as well. Thus, during the deliberations of the Commission on Criminal Law, Edmund Mezger justified his support for retributive justice by claiming that the "Zweckstrafe leads to a totalitarian criminal law." 119 These arguments allowed the commission to justify both the retention of the highly stigmatizing Zuchthausstrafe (imprisonment with hard labor) and the retention of short-term prison sentences (as opposed to alternative sanctions). Before the official Commission on Criminal Law made these decisions, the direction that postwar penal reform would take had still been an open question. In a 1955 lecture in Vienna, Richard Lange contrasted the Commission's recent decisions with international developments and the penal reform trajectory of the Weimar Republic, concluding that the Commission had taken a "surprising" direction:
It must appear surprising that already in the first meetings to lay the foundations of its work, the German commission on criminal law has taken a different, almost opposite approach. The new direction is characterized by a conscious return to a commitment to material justice. . . . The commission has quite consciously tried to establish a firm structure of values between the absolute and the relative purposes and meanings of punishment. 120 Despite holding on to a retributive model of criminal justice, nearly all professors of criminal law who tended in this direction-and this was the overwhelming majority-tried to integrate some elements of individualized prevention into the criminal law. More far-reaching ideas for reform, however, were blocked by the fundamental decision in favor of a retributive system of criminal justice. In the draft code produced by the official Commission on Criminal Law between 1954 and 1959, the retributivists were able to impose their notions on the system of penal sanctions. Although they agreed, for example, to limit the Zuchthausstrafe to serious crimes, they prevented its elimination, arguing that the "social-ethical condemnation," which differed for criminal acts of varying gravity, had to be reflected in different types of punishment. Similarly, even though short-term prison sentences were viewed as problematic, nothing was done aside from a name change: prison terms of one week to one month were going to be called Straf haft rather than Gefängnis strafen. The minimum term for Zuchthausstrafen should be two years. Suspended sentences with probation were to be an option for prison sentences up to nine months' duration. 121 Fines should be imposed along the lines of the Scandinavian system of dagsböter, fines levied in proportion to the offender's daily wages and ability to pay. 122 The criminal law professors' reluctance to revise the system of penal sanctions thoroughly as well as their divergence from international developments can be explained by their endorsement of retributive justice (and, to some extent, general deterrence) rather than individualized prevention as the primary purpose of criminal justice. This should not, however, leave the impression that the discourse of the retributivists was entirely homogeneous. Even professors of criminal law who endorsed the idea of retribution could oppose the Zuchthausstrafe and shortterm prison sentences, as Hans-Heinrich Jescheck and Paul Bockelmann, both members of the Commission on Criminal Law, did. 123 According to Jescheck, making punishments match an offender's guilt by no means required that every punishment must be executed (rather than suspended).
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Such distinctions, however, faded before the fundamental decision in favor of a criminal justice system based on retribution. This point was driven home by critics such as Thomas Würtenberger, who began the published version of his 1955 inaugural lecture, "The Intellectual Situation of German Academic Criminal Law," 125 with an attack on the current state of criminal law at the law faculties:
Behind the mask of tough adherence to a criminal law based on guilt and retribution, which is certainly justified at its core, a deplorable "doctrinarianism" has spread. All this leads to the result that a true breakthrough to a social criminal justice system [soziale Strafrechtsordnung] has eluded German academic criminal law [Strafrechtswissen schaft].
Opinions regarding the meaning and purpose of punishment are-not least in the effort to achieve a reform of criminal law-mostly characterized by a fear of genuine penal policy decisions. This is most noticeable in a pronounced mistrust of individualization and Spezialprävention as key penal policy concepts of our time. 126 Those professors of criminal law who, like Würtenberger, wished to reform the criminal justice system in the direction of individualized prevention were in the minority. Their reform agenda had no place for the Zuchthausstrafe or for shortterm prison sentences. Instead, they called for replacing short prison terms with other sanctions such as fines, alternative punishments such as the suspension of driver's licenses, or suspended sentence with probation. Moreover, the prison system (Strafvollzug) played an important role in their argumentation. 127 After the decisions of the Commission on Criminal Law had brought a victory for retributive justice, some of the proponents of individualized prevention, such as Eberhard Schmidt, sought to shift priority from the reform of criminal law to a reform of the prison system. "Would it not be perhaps more important to use all of the energy for reform and all the means available to achieve a thorough reform of our prison system [Strafvollzug]?" he asked in 1957 128 and criticized the retributivists' fixation on jurisprudence and theory:
In my view, the revival of the idea of retribution is to blame for the fact that the fundamental conceptions of punishment, its purpose, and sentencing have been derived entirely from the realm of theory, and that the hard realities that actually determine the fate of those convicted in the prison system remain completely unexamined. 129 It is also quite possible that Schmidt's shift from the subject of criminal law reform to the subject of prison reform was primarily strategic because he had been unable to prevail against the proponents of retributive justice in the first arena. Schmidt placed himself within the tradition of the "modern school of criminal law" of Franz von Liszt, with whom he had studied, whereas the retributivists oriented themselves toward Kant and Hegel-at least partly in an effort to overcome the stain of the Nazi past through recourse to leading lights of German philosophy. 130 By contrast, Eberhard Schmidt, Rudolf Sieverts, and others embraced a more pragmatic approach and focused on the so-called hard realities of the prison system. While the discourse of the retributivists was primarily normative, based on a formulaic equivalence of offense and punishment, the discourse of those favoring individualized prevention was characterized by frequent references to the actual administration of punishment. Thus it should come as no surprise that most of the criminal law professors who championed individualized prevention were active participants in the Working Group for the Reform of the Prison System (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für die Reform des Strafvollzugs). The Arbeitsgemeinschaft, founded in the 1923, 131 met again for the first time after the war in 1948. It included practitioners who worked in the prison system or dealt with prison matters in the bureaucracy as well as professors of criminal law who were interested in the prison system, often quite consciously continuing discussions of the Weimar years. 132 Its inner circle was composed of Eberhard Schmidt (chairman) and Rudolf Sieverts (secretary), both also members of the Commission on Criminal Law, as well as criminal law professors Wolfgang Mittermaier and Thomas Würtenberger. 133 The Arbeitsgemeinschaft's first resolution in 1948 simply called for the implementation of an educational approach in the penal system, the training and hiring of prison personnel educated in Sozialpädagogik, and unified regulations for the penal system. 134 At its second meeting in 1950, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft supplemented these demands with calls to restrict the imposition of prison sentences and to abolish the distinction between Zuchthaus and Gefängnis. The group thus explicitly picked up where the Weimar reform movement had left off and established clear positions on key issues before the beginning of the later work on reform.
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Conclusion
What was the attraction of a retributivist conception of criminal justice for the majority of criminal law professors in the 1950s? The question can only be answered by reference to a complex of reasons ranging from psychological and social factors to individual preferences to the historical situation of the postwar period and the legacy of the Nazi past. Many of them have been suggested in the course of this chapter.
First, the sociologist Hans Braun has used the phrase "the pursuit of security" (Streben nach Si cherheit) to characterize the collective social-psychological state of German society in the 1950s. 136 If we compare the competing positions in the penal reform debate, the concept of retributive criminal justice undoubtedly conveyed a greater degree of security. First, existing criminal law was already oriented in this direction. Second, one could draw on the politically unproblematic "classical" era of German history around 1800 with its important figureheads Kant and Hegel. Third, retributivists could remain within the security of the "ivory tower" of ideas and philosophical meditations on the meaning and purpose of punishment without exposing themselves to the uncertainties of empiricism and a pragmatic penal policy, an orientation that also reflected the trend toward depoliticization and an apolitical academy.
Second, the inclination toward retributive criminal law was at least partially prepared by the renaissance of natural law. In the postwar era, natural law was important for coming to terms with and prosecuting Nazi injustice, but also pushed the penal reform discourse toward legal philosophy, that is, grounding criminal law on a metaphysical rather than a pragmatic foundation. As law professor Walter Sax put it in 1957: "Every legal policy must . . . transcend the narrow realm of utility to the state; that is, taking full consideration of the factual needs of community life, it must derive its fundamental aims from realms that lie beyond the state [staatsjenseitigen Bereichen]." 137 Third, the expulsion of Jewish and left-wing professors of criminal law during the Nazi regime had severely weakened certain reform traditions. As the sociologist M. Rainer Lepsius wrote, "[T]he emigration is . . . more than the sum of persecuted individuals, it also represents traditions and ideas, academic paradigms and ways of looking at problems, artistic styles and programs." 138 The casualties of emigration included criminal law professors who had been active in the prison reform in the Weimar era (such as Max Grünhut) as well as some who were criminologically oriented (such as Hermann Mannheim). In the 1950s, German criminology was primarily the domain of psychiatrists, as our analysis of the Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform demonstrated. For the proponents of a retributivist criminal law, criminological knowledge was not necessary because absolute theories of punishment derive from norms rather than empirical data. For the proponents of Spezialprävention, however, the lack of an interest in criminology among most criminal law professors was an additional handicap.
Fourth, on the few occasions when Nazi criminal justice was discussed after 1945, the majority of criminal law professors portrayed it as Präven tions strafrecht, that is, a criminal justice system based on Generalprävention (general deterrence) and Spezialprävention (individualized prevention), rather than retribution; given the prominence of retributivist arguments and rhetoric in Nazi criminal justice, this was at the least a one-sided interpretation. Nevertheless, it resulted in placing postwar reform proposals that emphasized prevention under general suspicion of either running roughshod over the perpetrator in the service of general deterrence or, more importantly, going too far in intervening in the life of the individual perpetrator through individualized preventive measures.
Fifth, the proponents of retributive criminal law succeeded in linking their theory of punishment to the West German Basic Law. The Basic Law's concept of the rule of law and its image of man both offered openings for legitimating a retributivist moral foundation of criminal law.
Finally, the retributivist direction of penal reform was also determined by the Justice Ministry's selection of the members of the official Commission on Criminal Law. The views of potential members were relatively easily to identify through publications and personal contacts. The published proceedings of the commission demonstrate how frequently Eberhard Schmidt found himself defending a minority position against the retributivists. The decisions of the commission then sent a message to the larger community of criminal law professors.
Notes
Translated by Keith D. Alexander and Richard F. Wetzell.
